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Governance structures for competition policy:
a case study of the Philippines
Helen Cabalu, Peter Kenyon, Paul Koshy, and Nick Wills-Johnson*
Abstract
Competition policy has become one of the key elements of national economic policy 
in many countries around the world. This is due to the important role that competition plays 
in ensuring that markets efficiently produce goods and services that best meet evolving 
consumer demands. This paper explores the rationale for a comprehensive competition policy 
and sets out the principles of governance and a suggested governance structure that would 
deliver an effective competition policy in the Philippines. It also explores the difficulties in 
implementing competition policy in a developing country where public policy governance 
structures are not well resourced.
JEL classification: H11, D02, O12, O53
Keywords: competition policy (Philippines), institutional design, political economy, impedi-
ments to competition policy
1. Introduction
Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, Philippine economic policies were largely 
directed toward an inward-looking protectionist trade regime and an industrial structure 
characterized by high levels of market concentration. The economic policies embraced (a) 
import-substitution; (b) a political economy of distorted incentives, subsidies, and vested 
interests that interfered with the efficient functioning of markets; and (c) a bias for capital-
intensive industries despite a comparative advantage in labor [IMF 1999]. In particular, 
competitive neutrality was undermined by a governance structure of socioeconomic elites 
with effective political linkages, resulting in a multiplicity of imperfectly competitive 
markets. The results were the capture of economic rents by the few and a very unequal 
distribution of wealth [Rijnsburger and Wijers 1995].
The PhiliPPine Review of economics
vol. Xliii no. 2 DecembeR 2006
*Helen Cabalu is a senior research fellow at the John Curtin Institute of Public Policy at Curtin University. Peter 
Kenyon is professor of economic policy at Curtin University in Perth, Western Australia. Paul Koshy is research 
associate at the John Curtin Institute of Public Policy at Curtin University. Nick Wills-Johnson is a research associate 
at the Planning and Transport Research Centre at Curtin University.
102	 Cabalu, Kenyon, Koshy, & Johnson: Governance structures for competition policy
Though growth was achieved (averaging more than 6 percent in 1975-80), it was 
accompanied by macroeconomic instability and driven by capital accumulation rather than 
growth in multifactor productivity (MFP). Capital was the chief source of growth, contributing 
almost three-fourths between 1980 and 1998. The contribution of MFP, on the other hand, 
was, by all measures, virtually negative [Cabalu et al. 2001:1-2].
There were two fundamental problems with the country’s growth strategy [IMF 1999]. 
At the macroeconomic level, the excessive buildup of external debt, while contributing 
to economic growth, proved untenable, exposing the country to the vagaries of financial 
shocks. This resulted in a debt crisis, fiscal deficits, and high inflation. At the microeconomic 
level, the deeply entrenched protectionist and misdirected trade policies and an economic 
milieu of anticompetitive behavior and political linkages contributed to inefficiencies and 
the misallocation of resources that retarded productivity growth. For instance, while there 
were incentives and subsidies for export promotion, they were mostly directed toward 
capital- and import-intensive industries for which the country had no clear comparative 
advantage. Investments were mainly in import-substituting industries and nontradables. 
Second, marketing boards were established, which instituted producer price controls in 
agriculture. In the case of sugar and coconuts, two of the country’s major exports, these 
marketing boards led to excessive rents being captured by a relatively small number of 
industry participants. Structural and policy-induced barriers to entry were created, and these 
weakened the contestability of markets, effectively hindering competition.
By the first half of the 1980s, the flaws inherent in inward-oriented, competition-
inhibiting growth strategies and political patronage (which came to be known as crony 
capitalism) began to unfold. Exacerbated by exogenous external shocks and domestic political 
turmoil, the country plunged into a recession. Output in 1980-85 failed to grow. The 1980s 
were viewed by many as a lost decade, and the country earned the derisory reputation in 
many critics’ eyes as the “sick man of Asia”.
2. Early economic reforms
Economic reform in the Philippines began in earnest by the late 1980s. The Aquino 
administration introduced several notable reforms. These included the gradual phasing out 
of quantitative restrictions on imports, the liberalization of foreign investments, and the 
dismantling of protected monopolies. The country embarked on a program of liberalization, 
deregulation, demonopolization, and privatization aimed at transforming the economy 
from an essentially inward-oriented growth strategy characterized by trade protectionism 
and imperfectly competitive markets to one in which economic progress is founded on the 
principles of competition, macroeconomic stability, and a political economy of meritocracy 
and accountability.
The steady improvement in growth during the 1990s was largely a result of a host of pro-
competitive economic reforms implemented by the Ramos administration. The government’s 
strong policy advocacy toward openness and competition led to the robust growth and the 
economic resilience of the country. Enhanced private sector participation was the major 
growth driver. From the mid-1980s up to the present, the share of government-owned and 
-controlled corporations in the sales of the top 1,000 largest corporations fell from about 
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20 percent to 6 percent [World Bank 2000]. The buoyant growth was complemented by 
the growth performance of merchandise exports, which increased from an average annual 
growth of 4 percent during the 1980s to 16 percent in the 1990s. This was due, in particular, 
to investments in semiconductor exports by multinational corporations in the country.
The structural reforms proved their significance when the country was able to 
weather the impact of the Asian crisis, escaping relatively unscathed the severe declines 
in output experienced in the region.1 The economic growth achieved by the country has 
been established chiefly through a platform of enhanced private sector participation and 
competition in industries such as telecommunications, shipping, and banking, among others. 
The challenge confronting the country is to sustain the momentum, by extending the various 
pro-competitive reforms in a well-defined and transparent process through the adoption of 
a comprehensive competition policy.
3. The need for a comprehensive competition policy
The need for a comprehensive policy framework containing the core principles of 
competition is clearly suggested by the declining trend in the country’s international 
competitiveness, despite the achievements of the late1980s and the 1990s. The Philippines’ 
competitiveness ranking has deteriorated in four key areas relative to many similar countries 
in the region (e.g., Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore). These are in overall competitiveness, 
domestic economy performance, internationalization, and restructuring of the economy. 
Indeed, only Indonesia seems to have performed worse in recent years (see Cabalu et al. 
[2001: Figure 1.1, 7-8]). While the country may have introduced policy reforms fostering 
competition, the competitiveness rankings highlight that the achievements so far are still 
below par with regional performance.
Challenges to competition must, therefore, be given careful policy focus. The pro-
competitive reforms that have been established remain potentially weak and vulnerable in 
scope and governance. The economic reforms need to be established in such a way that not 
only are they broad-based but also have an adequate legislative and regulatory framework to 
rely on. This requires an adequate institutional framework, one that is adequately resourced 
to research competition issues and to investigate and prosecute breaches of competition 
policy. In short, the liberal reform agenda requires a comprehensive competition policy 
framework [Cabalu et al. 1999].
The challenge is substantial. The Philippine corporate sector is dominated by a relatively 
small number of family-based conglomerates [World Bank 2000]. Control over the sector 
is exercised by an economically privileged few. The top 5.5 percent of all landholding 
families has controlling interest over 44 percent of arable land, and the richest 15 percent 
of all families captures more than 50 percent of all national income [PHILEXPORT 1998]. 
In addition, there is a high degree of cross-ownership. According to a 1997 survey, 757 of 
1 Output in the country declined by 0.5 percent compared to the regional experience of 6-14 percent in 1997-98. 
If it were not for the 6 percent drop in agricultural output brought about by the El Niño phenomenon, the country 
could well have avoided the contraction.
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the largest corporations (ranked by sales value) were Philippine owned and of these 216 
belonged to just 39 corporate groups. These groups accounted for over 51 percent of all 
corporate sales [World Bank 2000:41]. By regional standards, the Philippines has one of 
the highest degrees of ownership concentration across firms (Table 1). 
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Source: World Bank [2000].
4. Competition policy
Before we address the application of competition policy in the Philippines, it is necessary 
to examine briefly the broad principles of competition policy and its enforcement. This we 
do in the next two sections of the paper.
Competition policy is a cornerstone of microeconomic policy. Approximately 80 
countries have implemented competition policy to date. A number of international agencies—
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the European Union (EU)—are moving slowly toward global 
competition laws (or at least adoption by increasing numbers of jurisdictions of harmonized 
competition laws). International aid agencies increasingly make adoption of competition 
policy a condition for ongoing aid, as competition policy is a powerful weapon in removing 
barriers to entry and structural inefficiencies within economies, making aid more effective 
in promoting development.
Competition policy starts with legislation and regulation to limit uncompetitive behavior 
by firms, especially that which comes from monopoly power. In the US and in many other 
jurisdictions, this comes under antitrust law. Competition policy is designed to protect 
competition, not competitors. The failure of an individual firm in competition with other 
firms is not necessarily indicative of a failure of competition policy, and may indeed indicate 
that an effective policy is in place.
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Competition policy also includes the regulation of the conduct of the government as it 
affects business, especially the conduct of government business enterprises and the capacity 
of government legislation and regulation to affect economic efficiency. An important part 
of competition policy is to take into account the public interest where competition does not 
achieve economic efficiency or conflicts with other social objectives.
The core element of competition policy is the removal of as many barriers to entry in as 
many sectors as is practically possible, as long as this is in the public interest [Singleton 1997]. 
The reason is that barriers to entry essentially protect firms from the forces of competition and 
lead to monopoly power. Barriers to entry may be usefully divided into three components: 
artificial barriers, natural barriers, and government-imposed barriers.
Artificial barriers refer to those created by firms to prevent other firms from entering 
or operating within an industry. These ultimately impact on customers through the higher 
prices and/or lower product quality that result from the lack of competition. They are 
welfare-reducing in that they distort relative prices away from the opportunity cost of 
resources. Examples of practices include price fixing, cartels, discrimination between 
different markets, exclusive dealing, tie-in arrangements and third-line forcing, retail price 
maintenance schemes and predatory pricing. They are the preserve of traditional antitrust 
policy, which addresses issues arising when firms treat each other in an egregious manner. 
Policy is directed at prohibiting anticompetitive agreements (both horizontal [i.e., between 
firms in the same market] and vertical [i.e., between firms in different markets but part of 
the same supply chain]), prohibiting abuses of market power and scrutinizing changes in 
industry structure (through, for example, corporate mergers and acquisitions) that may result 
in abuses of market power.
Natural barriers refer to those that are intrinsic to sectors of the economy with high sunk 
costs. Natural barriers to entry occur because the minimum efficient scale of production 
is a single firm. Such conditions of supply are often prevalent in national infrastructure, 
such as electricity and gas provision, water, transport systems, telecommunications, and 
the like. However, these barriers can be ameliorated through the provision of third-party 
(or open) access regimes and the regulation of assets that exhibit natural barriers to entry. 
Access regimes ameliorate the barriers to entry for new market entrants associated with 
industries upstream and downstream. An important part of competition policy in this area is 
to scrutinize such industries for elements where natural monopoly elements are not present 
and to introduce competition in these elements where feasible. For example, it may well be 
that the distribution of electricity (“the wires”) may be a natural monopoly, but generation 
and retail sales are not. Competition policy is directed at creating competitive markets 
(often through sophisticated market design) to introduce competition and contestability 
wherever possible.
Government-imposed barriers refer to barriers to entry that exist due to both legislative 
and policy decisions and the actions of government-owned business enterprises. They 
include two elements. The first is legislation and administrative directives that create 
barriers, such as licenses and government franchises. The second is conduct by government, 
which raises barriers to entry, such as policy decisions favoring one set of firms over others 
and/or activities by government-owned business enterprises, which disadvantage private 
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competitors. Government barriers can be addressed by legislative reform and competitive 
neutrality programs and through the application of antitrust measures to the public sector. 
An important aspect of competition policy with respect to reducing government-imposed 
barriers is the restructuring of government business enterprises through corporatization or 
privatization.
5. The enforcement and administration of competition policy
Enforcement and administration are critical components of an effective, comprehensive 
competition policy. Effective enforcement requires effective institutions to convert legislative 
intention into policy action. There are two aspects to enforcement: (a) the legal system and 
the role of the courts and (b) the nature of governance of competition policy by the state 
institution designed to implement competition policy and industry regulation.
In most jurisdictions, the predominant role of the courts is in the areas of antitrust and 
access to infrastructure (see Cabalu et al. [2001: chapter 6]). A key issue is the extent to 
which a country’s standard court system is the best judicial vehicle to deal with antitrust 
matters or whether a special court should be introduced to deal with antitrust and industry 
regulatory matters. Largely, this hinges on the capacity of the conventional court system to 
consider detailed economic argument, and to make judgements based on economic criteria 
in the context of proficient law. Whereas the United States has developed a tradition of the 
marriage of the disciplines of law and economics and thus its courts seem able to make 
sophisticated economic judgements, albeit not without controversy, this is not true in many 
other jurisdictions. Often, good economics is sacrificed for reasons that are not apparent to 
economists, but which may satisfy other interests.
For these reasons, some jurisdictions have developed specialist judicial bodies to deal 
with antitrust. However, a consideration in respect of such arrangements is to guard against 
the possibility of regulatory capture. It may well be that a specialist court would run the 
risk of becoming too close to the protagonists and not be sufficiently mindful of the public 
interest.2
Nevertheless, given the role of the standard court system generally as the supreme 
adjudicatory body in democratic societies, it is appropriate that they have a role in hearing 
appeals against the decisions of any quasi-judicial enforcement body that may be created for 
the purposes of antitrust and other aspects of regulatory adjudication. This occurs in many 
countries, including the European Union. Given the issue of the interjurisdictional nature 
of competition cases, this is typically the role of the highest court in the judicial system 
(e.g., the US Supreme Court).
Turning to the key design issues for state institutions charged with implementing 
competition policy and industry regulation, there are four key design issues:
2 It is instructive that Australia’s quasi-judicial system for the conduct of industrial relations was vehemently 
criticized by many commentators as being captured by peak union and employer bodies, to the detriment of 
economically advantageous industrial relations and the public interest. For a representative argument, see 
McGuiness [1985].
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Independence. Critical for the enforcement agency is its ability to remain independent 
from the political process, but with sufficient safeguards to ensure transparency and 
accountability.
Investigatory powers. Critical to enforcing antitrust is the ability to successfully 
investigate cases. The enforcement agency should have sufficient powers to conduct thorough 
investigations.
Separation of investigation and adjudication. There are two key roles to be performed 
by a competition authority: investigation and adjudication. The essential issue involved 
where investigation and adjudication occur within the same organization is a concern about 
the independence of the process.
Funding. Adequate resourcing is required and can be provided either by the state, or 
through the fines and other penalties imposed for breaches of competition policy and from 
other fees. Ideally, funding should be primarily provided by the state through general taxation 
revenues. Fees should still be charged for services to reduce vexatious or spurious use of the 
agency’s resources; however, they should not become a major source of revenue.
Research capability. Competition policy is a rapidly evolving field of both academic 
study and practice. Ideally, the agency should have the capacity to thoroughly research 
competition issues. This is to ensure that the best contemporary theory and evidence is at 
hand to evaluate issues as they arise.
6. Implementation of competition policy in the Philippines
The Philippines has in place many of the preconditions to achieve the goal of successful 
implementation of a comprehensive competition policy. However, the pursuit of policy to 
increase the degree of competition has not been as effective as is possible. Partially, this has 
been due to poor formulation of the laws and a lack of a centralized enforcement agency 
with sufficient powers and responsibility to pursue its tasks.
6.1. Legislative issues
It is considered that House Bill 1373 (the Fair Trade Act of 1994, presented by Rep. 
Gerardo S. Espina) and House Bill 183 (the Fair Trade Act of 1998, presented by Rep. 
Rolando A. Briones) represent good solutions to the development of an appropriate 
competition policy in the Philippines currently being proposed. The bills are almost identical. 
However, they do require some improvement in order to achieve a comprehensive approach 
to competition policy. (For an extensive discussion, see Cabalu et al. [2001:chapter 8].) Areas 
where improvements might usefully be made include the following:
• Definitions of Terms (section 3) especially the definitions of “monopoly”, 
“oligopoly”, and “cartel”.
• Unlawful Business Practices (section 4), which addresses unlawful business 
practices: monopolization, mergers and collusion, and other issues. A greater degree 
of clarity is required and there is a need for several additions and/or changes.
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• Divestment (section 5) requires the divestment of a certain portion of any monopoly, 
regardless of its conduct. If, however, the prohibitions described in section 4 are 
properly applied, there should be no reason to apply section 5, as the activities of 
entrenched monopolies can be effectively controlled. There are also dangers related 
to the incentive to invest and sovereign risk.
• Fair Trade Commission (section 6) action in respect of fines for breaches and the 
relationship with court action requires further clarity. In addition, it is recommended 
that the bills be amended to require the publication of detailed guidelines on 
enforcement, which would be a useful “code of conduct” for business; and for 
the enforcement agency also to offer informal guidance to business as well. Also, 
there is need for clarity and/or changes with respect to the scope of work, reporting 
requirements, qualifications of senior officials (section 8), and funding.
• Penalties (section 14) and Award of Damages (section 15) both need further 
clarification and/or changes.
In order to implement a comprehensive competition policy, there are also a number of 
issues not addressed by the Espina and Briones bills. The most important ones are
• legislative reviews,
• competitive neutrality,
• restructuring of public monopolies and privatization, and
• access to critical infrastructure.
Appropriate legislation needs to be drafted and appropriate administrative arrangements 
need to be put in place to cover these crucial areas of a comprehensive competition policy. 
Also, care must be taken to repeal any legislation that conflicts with the proposed new 
legislation.
Because there is a current lack of experience and knowledge in competition policy 
matters in the Philippines, it is crucial that there be sufficient training arrangements in place 
for judicial and administrative officials in the theory and specific practice of all aspects of 
competition policy. International agencies and strategic arrangements with other countries 
(such as staff exchanges) may fill this gap.
6.2. Institutional issues
There is also the need to set in place an appropriate institutional structure to implement 
the policy, once legislative requirements are met. The institutional framework is as important 
as the detail of the policy itself. Key tasks associated with implementation involve both 
policy analysis and advice, and administration. A comprehensive study by Cabalu et al. [1999, 
2001] sets out a framework and a suggested institutional structure. A guiding principle of 
that framework is an economy-wide approach with a single regulatory agency, the proposed 
Philippine Competition Commission. An economy-wide approach, rather than a sector-by-
sector approach is recommended for two reasons.
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First, apart from administrative savings, it is argued that there are more economic 
similarities between industries than differences. Consequently, a single competition agency 
would have the virtue of ensuring consistency in regulation across sectors. This would lead to 
greater economic efficiency than would be the case where different industries faced different 
regulatory incentives and strictures. Second, an economy-wide institution is less likely to be 
subject to regulatory capture, a real possibility in single-industry regulatory institutions.
It is proposed that a new institution, the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), be 
set up under a specific Act of Congress. The PCC would oversee the conduct of competition 
policy in the Philippines. The PCC should have two separate (but complementary) functions: 
one function is policy analysis and advice, and the other is administration and enforcement. 
Two offices within the PCC are envisaged: the Office for Policy Analysis and Advice (OPAA) 
and the Competition and Consumers Welfare Administration (CCWA)
The OPAA within the PCC would be in charge of policy analysis and have the following 
characteristics:3
• It would be advisory in nature and would not perform any administrative 
functions.
• It would be independent of any government department or authority. However, its 
activities should complement and be consistent with the work program of the other 
department within the PCC.
• It would adopt an integrated, economy-wide perspective of competition policy 
issues rather than be restricted by industry-specific matters.
• It would focus on facilitating practical reforms in the short-run, while examining 
reforms for the longer term.
• It would open channels of communication to all affected interests to present their 
views.
• It would recognize the existence of skills and resources of other agencies and, 
hence, not duplicate them. It would draw on their expertise for analytical work.
Its major functions would be as follows:4
• To provide advice to government departments or agencies on policy questions 
concerning the content of the rules of competitive conduct and legislated 
exemptions.
• To provide advice to government departments or agencies on the development 
and implementation of agreed principles governing regulatory restrictions on 
competition, structural reform of public monopolies, access rights, pricing matters, 
3 These characteristics were adapted from the Hilmer report [1993] describing Australia’s National Competition 
Council.
4 Adapted from Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell [1993].
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competitive neutrality; and other issues associated with transition toward a more 
competitive environment.
• Implementation of the agreed principles would rest with individual government 
departments, with the OPAA playing a support role in terms of policy 
development.
• To provide advice on the development and implementation of the national 
competition policy. To undertake or coordinate economy-wide reviews of regulatory 
restrictions on competition and of structural reform issues relating to public 
monopolies—in particular, proposed privatizations that involve the transfer of a 
significant public monopoly to the private sector.
The functions of the CCWA in charge of administration of competition policy would 
be to5
• enforce compliance with competitive conduct rules;
• monitor compliance with conduct rules and report legislated and regulatory 
exemptions regularly;
• administer the prices oversight function of the competition policy, particularly 
monopoly pricing;
• oversee the administration of the national access regime and the implementation 
of pro-competitive safeguards; and, finally,
• disseminate information and provide public education on the general conduct rules 
and other competition issues.
Importantly, the PCC would build up a fund of economic and social-policy expertise, 
which, over time, will prove to be an effective knowledge base for policy advice and 
administration to ensure the development of the Philippine economy as a dynamic and 
internationally competitive market.
It is essential that the PCC be adequately staffed and resourced to discharge its duties to 
implement and oversee national competition policy. The PCC should be seen as being one 
of the most prestigious economic agencies, with remuneration and conditions sufficient to 
attract an expert and dedicated staff.
7. The political economy of competition policy in the Philippines
One of the major barriers to implementing a comprehensive competition policy in the 
Philippines is the nature of the interaction between economics and politics in the Philippines. 
The Philippines does not rate well in international surveys of perceptions of corruption. 
However, to speak of corruption in the Philippines as interpreted from the perspective 
of North American or Western European values is to misunderstand a vital component of 
5 Adapted from Hilmer, Rayner, and Taperell [1993].
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Philippine culture and the value system of the Filipino people. As is the case in many Latin 
American countries, and possibly many African countries, too, at all levels of Philippine 
society, there is a system of “mutual obligation,” which spreads out from the extended family 
to the local community—“the Barrio”, and from there to the Province and ultimately to 
national politics. To participate in the economic and political sphere, there is an obligation 
on those who succeed to repay through favored treatment those that supported their rise. 
Similarly, there is an obligation on each person to support members of their extended family 
to succeed by assisting them financially and supporting them as best he or she can in their 
quest. When this system of mutual obligation is combined with the concentration of economic 
resources in a relatively small number of family-based conglomerates, the scope of what 
has become known as “crony capitalism” is very great.
As we saw in section 3 of this paper, the Philippine economy is very concentrated. 
The Philippine corporate sector is dominated by a relatively small number of family-based 
conglomerates, and control over the major corporations is exercised by an economically 
privileged few. In agriculture, the top 6 percent of all landholding families has controlling 
interest over nearly 50 percent of arable land. The richest 15 percent of all families captures 
more than 50 percent of all national income. There is also a high degree of cross-ownership. 
Of the largest corporations (ranked by sales value) that are Philippine owned, nearly 30 
percent belongs to just 39 corporate groups and these groups account for over 50 percent 
of all corporate sales. By regional standards, the Philippines has one of the highest degrees 
of ownership concentration of industry.
The Philippines is a democratic country, its politics a very vibrant and popular process. 
But formal participation in the political process requires considerable resources. Part of the 
reason is the necessity to build and maintain extended political alliances. Political parties 
are not pervasive and well-disciplined structures when compared with North American or 
Western European party systems. Rather, politics consist of complex alliances of family 
and regional groupings, held together by mutual obligation and extended barrio and family 
connections as much as by ideology. Added to this is a history of domination by political 
elites, both in terms of the autocracy of the relatively recent Marcos years, and before that, 
extended periods of colonial domination by, first, Spain and then the United States.
This system has given rise to a version of “crony capitalism” that entrenches political and 
economic power. This politico-economic system is illustrated in Figure 1. Crony capitalism 
is, in this scheme, an extended system of rent exchange.
In such a politico-economic system, the will to implement competition policy is weak, 
not because of the lack of power of ideas, or even the lack of a widely held belief that such 
a policy would ultimately lead to better economic outcomes in the Philippines. Rather, the 
issue is that the whole purpose of competition policy is to break down economic power and 
to spread economic power to the extent that individual economic agents cannot by their 
own actions control market outcomes. This means that the implementation of competition 
policy is unlikely to gain favor with the political and economic elites currently in place. The 
greatest advocates for competition policy in the Philippines are not “big business” but rather 
the relatively powerless—the consumer advocacy groups, student activists, academics, and 
those outside the corridors of power.
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Is competition policy in the Philippines therefore a lost cause? We do not think so. 
The reason is that the Philippines sees itself and wants to be seen as a “good regional and 
global citizen”. That is, the Philippines takes its obligations under regional and international 
economic and political alliances seriously and, increasingly, implementing competition 
policy is becoming a major part of being in the forefront of international organizations and 
alliances. 
The international context is important. A number of international agencies are moving 
toward global competition laws (or at least adoption by increasing numbers of jurisdictions 
of harmonized competition laws). International aid agencies, such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, increasingly make adoption of competition policy a condition 
for ongoing loans and aid, as competition policy is a powerful weapon in removing barriers 
to entry and structural inefficiencies within economies, making aid more effective in 
promoting development.6 For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—of 
which the Philippines is a member—has shown an interest in competition policy for some 
time, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)7 has developed for APEC the 
PECC Competition Principles [1999] to formalize ongoing dialogue into a series of 
6 For an in-depth review of this subject, see UNCTAD [1999].
7 PECC is a partnership of senior business, government, and research individuals working in a non-official 
capacity on policy issues. It is the only nongovernment, official observer of APEC, and has a seat at all meetings 
of the APEC ministers and officials.
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nonbinding principles for APEC members. PECC [1999] recommends that APEC economies 
embrace a number of measures that go a long way down the comprehensive competition 
policy path. According to the recommendations, member countries are to
• reevaluate all relevant government legislation and regulations to ascertain the extent 
to which these distort competition, particularly in sectors of relative economic 
importance in the domestic economy;
• develop an action plan for this reevaluation with a view to minimizing distortions 
of market mechanisms, including efficiency-reducing barriers to market entry;
• implement that action plan for the domestic economy, including the development of 
appropriate criteria for future government interventions in globalizing markets;
• promote the maximum degree of transparency with respect to substantive 
provisions, procedures, and decision-making in legal, administrative, and regulatory 
regimes;
• minimize the risk of anticompetitive business conduct through appropriate 
competition disciplines on business conduct and effective surveillance and 
enforcement of those disciplines, including appropriate deterrent measures and, 
in this context, consider enactment of at least a modest domestic competition law 
that
(a) embodies the explicit objective of promoting the process of competition in 
order to enhance efficiency in the marketplace;
(b) contains provisions with respect to “hard-core” horizontal cartel activity (price-
fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation, and group boycotts), egregious abuses 
of a dominant position, and mergers or takeovers of large firms;
(c) contains as few sectoral and other exemptions as possible;
(d) is ultimately administered and enforced by an independent agency.
• Explore the benefits of engaging in international cooperation among competition 
agencies and authorities.
Therefore, in terms of its participation in many regional and international groupings, the 
Philippines will be increasingly under pressure to take active steps to implement competition 
policy. Competition policy, in this sense, is part of the process of globalization.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the Philippine economy would benefit from the 
introduction of a comprehensive competition policy that minimizes artificial, natural, and 
government-induced barriers to entry. This is because the Philippine economy is characterized 
by extreme concentration. We have suggested legal changes that are necessary and a 
governance structure for the implementation and operation of competition policy. However, 
we note that the pervasiveness of mutual obligation in Philippine political life, together with 
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high levels of economic concentration, does not provide a fertile environment for the adoption 
of competition policy by the Philippine political elites. If competition policy is to progress 
in the Philippines, we argue that the impetus will come from external obligations of the 
Philippines to regional and international economic alliances and organizations.
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